Second, what is the relative importance of these institutions and employer strategies in explaining wage variation within countries?
These two sets of factors are linked because the degree of centralization influences the extent of flexibility in wage setting at estab lishment levels. As centralized systems break down, employers may have new opportunities for wage setting at the organizational level (Brown, Marginson, and Walsh 2003 The indicators in Table 1 suggest that pat terns in emerging market countries are closer to those in liberal market than in coordinated market countries. All of the emerging market countries have relatively low levels of union density and collective bargaining coverage (Blanchflower 2006 that is, the largest group of employees serv ing as call center agents. We provide a brief summary below and focus on specific issues that apply to this paper.
Sample and Survey Administration
The sample for this article consists of 1,819 observations from 15 of the 17 countries in the study. The Netherlands and Spain were excluded due to missing observations for key variables.
Every effort was made to take a consistent approach to sampling and survey tions, and all others, the omitted category).
Data Analytic Strategy
Our data analysis is in two stages. First, we did a series of calculations of overall wage dispersion for each country, using several indices, including the coefficient of varia tion, the standard deviation of logs, and the gini coefficient. These statistics are based on our establishment-level data, weighted by establishment size, and are presented in Table   3 . Second, to examine the relative impor tance of collective bargaining and employer strategies of segmentation and outsourcing, we did a series of multiple regressions using the pooled international data set and robust standard errors, which provide a Huber cor rection for country effect that takes into ac count the non-independence of observations within each country. Our series of models includes the key independent variables and different sets of control variables (Table 4 ). We then estimated full models that include all of the control variables plus interaction terms.
Because of the large number of countries, we used separate equations to examine the country interaction terms for our three independent variables (Table 5 ).
Finally, we calculated the magnitude of the wage differential associated with each of our independent variables and whether it was statistically significant. We then compared the magnitude and significance levels of these differentials across our three types of economies, and across countries within each category (Table 6) .
Results
The means, standard deviations, and pair wise correlations for the data used in this paper are provided in Table 2 . The means and standard deviations, by country, are provided in Appendix E of the introduction.
Wage Dispersion
The analyses in Table 3 and segmentation. Table 5 includes the country interaction terms, and Table  6 provides the calculations of wage differentials based on these regression analyses.
Results in Table 4 show that, for the dataset as a whole, ences are shown in Table 5 . The models replicate the full model in We also hypothesized that union wage differ entials and business center differentials would be smaller in coordinated economies than in liberal or emerging market economies, while in-house differentials would be larger. To test these hypotheses, we calculated the country-specific wage differentials (for mated differential of 29.7%?higher than in most of the liberal market economies. Denmark also had a statistically significant, but much smaller, union differential (7.8%). and because research has found that single-respondent bias is lower for establishment-level surveys than for surveys of larger organizational units (Gerhart et al. 2000 
